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SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON TRIDENT II REENTRY VEHICLE ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, JUNE 2, 2005

REF: GENEVA 1365 (JCIC-XXVII-014)

Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-018.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: June 2, 2005
Time: 5:10 - 5:50 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) A Working Group Meeting was held at the Russian Mission on June 2, 2005, to discuss inspection procedures to address Russian concerns that its inspectors cannot confirm that Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are not deployed with more reentry vehicles than attributed. The U.S. proposed the added procedure of using the RVOSI measuring device demonstrated to the Parties at Kings Bay Submarine Base, February 7-9, 2005. The U.S. Delegation provided answers to questions raised at a May 31, 2005 Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting (REFTEL) regarding the use of the RVOSI measuring device and provided additional details regarding the U.S.-proposed procedures.

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM
MAY 31, 2005 HOD MEETING

[1](#)4. (S) Emig began the meeting by stating its objectives, which he summarized as: (1) to respond to Russian questions raised during the May 31, 2005 HOD meeting (REFTEL); (2) to provide additional details regarding the U.S.-proposed supplemental procedures for Trident II RVOSIs; and (3) to identify areas where the sides agreed and disagreed as part of an effort to resolve Trident II RVOSI concerns.

[1](#)5. (S) Emig provided the following answers to the questions raised at the May 31, 2005 HOD meeting (REFTEL):

-- Question 1: Would the 3 percent rule apply during the use of the RVOSI measuring device as it usually applies to measurements in the Treaty?

-- Answer 1: No. Look correctly stated (REFTEL) that this rule could not apply. Use of the Trident RVOSI measuring device involves the relationship between three items: the missile, the RVOSI cover, and the device itself. This is very different from normal Treaty measurements, which usually measure one, much larger object. The 3 percent rule would allow less than 1 cm of tolerance. U.S. engineers determined that 3 cm overall tolerance is necessary to account for the variances among the three elements, along with the process of field measurements. The United States believes a 3 cm tolerance would provide the necessary confidence in the measurements and the measuring device.

-- Question 2: What if the measurements obtained during the inspection differ from the measurements agreed to as a result of the Trident II demonstration?

-- Answer 2: As Look previously stated (REFTEL), if measurements are not within the 3 cm tolerance of the benchmark value, the United States anticipates inspectors would include an ambiguity in the inspection report.

REVIEW OF U.S.-PROPOSED
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEDURES

[1](#)6. (S) Emig provided the following description of the supplemental procedures envisioned by the United States for Trident II RVOSIs:

-- After all of the inspectors complete their 15 minutes

of viewing of the installed Trident II RVOSI hard cover, the escort team chief will request the inspection team chief and one additional member of the inspection team return to the temporary structure for viewing the SLBM launcher, where the inspectors will be given the opportunity to examine the measuring device.

-- The two inspectors would then observe the facility personnel take two official measurements in the same manner as performed at the February 2005 demonstration. The escort team chief would record these measurements for the inspection report.

-- To reiterate, the benchmark measurement for a Trident II Type A SLBM configuration is 23 cm plus/minus 3 cm. Type B benchmark measurement is 24 cm plus/minus 3 cm.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ON PROCEDURES

17. (S) Fedorchenko inquired about the reference to a 15-minute viewing period for the inspectors, stating that the Treaty contains the right for each inspector to view and participate in measurements, and that current RVOSI practice is to allow two inspectors a total of 15 minutes of viewing time each. He questioned whether the U.S. proposal was to allow 15 minutes each for five subgroups of two inspectors to confirm the measurements. Emig responded that the viewing structure is small and, as a consequence, only two inspectors could be allowed inside at the same time. He reiterated that the U.S. proposal provided for a total of two measurements with the measuring device.

18. (S) Fedorchenko stated that within the Treaty there are only two or three cases in which subgroups are pulled from inspection teams. Emig sought clarification whether Fedorchenko was suggesting the Treaty required the United States to allow five measurements with the measuring device. Fedorchenko responded that there were two options: either all ten inspectors are allowed to view the measurements with the measuring device or five sets of measurements are completed by five teams of two inspectors. Mullins then engaged, noting that the idea of using a subgroup of two inspectors to confirm measurements is not without precedence, providing as an example SS-18 RVOSIs. Fedorchenko replied that he understood, but the U.S. proposal limited inspectors performing inspections under Article XI, Paragraph 6 of the Treaty. He disagreed with the U.S. position that the proposal was sufficient for RVOSIs, stating that of ten inspectors, only two could be sure that the front section did not contain more reentry vehicles than the number attributed. Mullins replied that the U.S. proposal did not limit inspectors; rather, these procedures were in addition to current practice. Shevtsov suggested that the U.S. proposal be provided in writing for evaluation by the Parties.

19. (S) Taran noted that inspection teams could include inspectors from each Party, and not all Parties would be represented if only two inspectors were allowed to confirm the measurements.

NEXT STEPS

10. (S) Emig asked whether there were other concerns, to which the Parties replied there were not. He asked the Parties to consider how an agreement would be documented, noting that the United States was considering a Coordinated Plenary Statement. He continued by stating that, regardless of form, an agreement should include a description of the procedures for using the measuring device, along with a statement confirming that the February 7-9, 2005 demonstration of the RVOSI measuring device at Kings Bay Submarine Base, in combination with the use of the measuring device at future Trident II RVOSIs, would resolve past concerns provided that benchmark measurements were achieved within the tolerances provided.

11. (S) Fedorchenko requested that the United States provide a written proposal to the Parties to allow formal discussions to begin as soon as possible. Emig replied that the United States would consider this request.

12. (U) Documents Exchanged: None.

13. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Col (S) Emig
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Herrick
Mr. Jones
Mr. Miller
Mr. Mitchner
Mr. Mullins
Mr. Page
Mr. Sessions

Mr. Singer
Mr. Smith
Mr. Tiersky
LCDR Woods
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Russia

Col Fedorchenko
Mr. Bolotov
Ms. Kotkova
Col Maksimenko
Col Razumov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shabalin
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Sorokina
Col Yegorov
Mr. Uspenskiy (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Taran

14. (U) Look sends.
Moley